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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the papers which appear in 
this special issue of Accounting Forum. The paper sets out the background 
and rationale for this special issue, introduces the papers contained within it 
and discusses their contributions to the literature on social and environmental 
accounting and accountability in emerging and less developed economies. 
This discussion is informed by the notions of vulnerability and exploitability. 
The final section of the paper provides conclusions and directions for future 
research in this under-researched area. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the papers which appear in this special 
issue of Accounting Forum. The special issue focuses on the need for corporate 
accountability and transparency in emerging and less developed economies. There is an 
incredible diversity in these economies, some, more commonly known as BRICs (Brazil, 
Russia, India and China) (Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003), have seen significant economic 
growth in recent times and this will inevitably have social and environmental effects. Others, 
for example eastern European and other less developed smaller ex colonial countries, are 
confronted with massive problems that include those related to the effects of climate change, 
poverty, human rights violations, child labour, corruption and social exploitations. Our 
premise is that business organisations, as the ‘engines of economic growth’ and as powerful 
institutions, should be held responsible and accountable for the related social and 
environmental consequences of their actions (Belal, 2002, 2008; Owen, Swift, & Hunt, 2001; 
Pachauri, 2004, 2006; Unerman & Bennett, 2004) and given the contentious nature of the 
issues in emerging and less developed economies the need for accountability is greater still. 
Complete and transparent social and environmental disclosures could be a mechanism to hold 
business organisations to account for their impacts within these economies. 
Despite this, however, research on social and environmental accounting in emerging and less 
developed economies is scarce (Belal & Owen, 2007; Islam & Deegan, 2008), although there 
are a number of exceptions such as a small, but increasing, knowledge base with regard to 
India (Batra, 1996; Hegde, Bloom, & Fuglister, 1997; Singh & Ahuja, 1983) and Bangladesh 
(Belal & Roberts, 2010; Belal, 2008; Belal & Owen, 2007; Islam & Deegan, 2008). 
Nevertheless it is still true to say that we know very little about social and environmental 
accounting practices in many of the emerging and less developed economies. It is important 
to increase our understanding of why and how social and environmental accounting is, or is 
not, evolving in these emerging and less developed economies for the ‘vivid challenges’ it 
can provide ‘….to the presuppositional baggage with which Western researchers typically 
3 
 
approach issues’ (Kisenyi & Gray, 1998, p.16). The socio-economic realities of these 
countries are different and, moreover, the corporate motivations for undertaking social and 
environmental accounting also appear to be different with ‘outside forces’ driving the agenda. 
Such driving forces include international agencies like the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (Rahaman, Lawrence, & Roper, 2004), international market pressures on 
export oriented companies (Belal & Owen, 2007; Islam & Deegan, 2008) and parent 
companies’ instructions on the subsidiaries operating in these economies (Belal & Owen, 
2007).   
The purpose of this special issue is to provide a forum to explore social and environmental 
accounting and accountability from the under researched context of emerging and less 
developed countries. Two features that bind this group of countries are the notions of 
vulnerability and exploitability. We have used these notions to develop an analytical 
framework for this paper and this is introduced in the next section. This is based on the 
relevant literature in this field of study. We then discuss the papers in this special issue and 
their contributions by drawing insights from this framework. The final section of the paper 
provides conclusions and future directions for research in this area. 
 
 
2. Analytical Framework: Vulnerability and exploitability of emerging and less 
developed economies 
 
Vulnerability, development and the role of business 
“The country classification in the World Economic Outlook divides the world into two major 
groups: advanced economies, and emerging and developing economies. This classification is 
not based on strict criteria, economic or otherwise, and it has evolved over time” (IMF, 2012, 
p. 177). This classification identifies 150 emerging and developing economies, which account 
for 48.9% of the world’s GDP, but has 85.1% of the world’s population. IMF (2012, Table A, 
p. 179) regionally groups the emerging and developing countries as follows: 
Table 1: IMF (2012) Emerging and Developing Economies by Region 
Regions Number of 
countries 
% of world GDP % of world 
population 
Central and Eastern Europe 14 3.5 2.6 
Commonwealth of Independent States 13 4.3 4.2 
Developing Asia 27 25.1 52.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean 32 8.7 8.4 
Middle East and North Africa 20 4.9 5.7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 44 2.5 11.9 
Total 150 48.9* 85.1 
Source: Adapted from IMF (2012) * Difference due to rounding 
 
There are massive contrasts between these economies and Brazil, China, India, Mexico and 
Russia are included, but account for more than half (57.3%) of the total GDP from these 150 
emerging and developing economies. Others have drawn on the World Bank’s classification 
of countries according to their Gross National Income per capita. Those economies that have 
been defined as low or middle income are also considered to be less developed or emerging. 
Less developed economies are usually associated with poverty, relatively lower income per 
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capita, and an economy that is primarily agricultural, less industrialised, in nature (see also 
Visser, 2008). In contrast, emerging economies are often perceived as those that are 
experiencing growth through industrialisation and are strengthening financial and 
informational infrastructure. 
 
These definitions imply that low income and poverty are key features within emerging and 
less developed countries, but, moreover, we contend that these countries are particularly 
vulnerable. There is a relatively long established relationship that has been identified between 
poverty and vulnerability  (see for example Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 1994). This 
relationship is evident in a number of measures of vulnerability that include “Vulnerability to 
Expected Poverty” and “Vulnerability as Threat of Future Poverty” (Montalbano, 2011).  The 
second of these approaches specifically refers to poverty and risk, as the two features that 
constitute vulnerability, whereas Montalbano (2011) argues that the World Bank’s “Social 
Risk Management” approach to vulnerability contains three key aspects, namely: risk; 
resilience/responsiveness; and a minimum level for the relevant outcome. An alternative 
“Sustainable Livelihood Vulnerability” approach is adopted by UNDP and this approach 
“incorporates an evaluation of sensitivity to negative shocks (“livelihood sensitivity”) as well 
as the endogenous ability to respond and recover (“livelihood resilience”).” It is this 
combination of risk and resilience that resonates with recent climate change discussions. This 
is to say that certain developing countries (such as Bangladesh) (Belal et al., 2010) have been 
identified as particularly vulnerable to climate change given their physical exposure to 
climate events and their lower ability to respond to such events and climate stress (Bowen, 
Cochrane, & Fankhauser, 2012). In contrast more developed countries tend to have lower 
risks and/or higher resilience and ‘adaptive capacity’ (Ward & Shively, 2012). It is their 
sensitivity to risks and limited ability to respond, due to limited technological and financial 
resources, which makes a large proportion of the populations of developing countries 
particularly vulnerable.  
 
Development can help reduce vulnerability and it is widely acknowledged that international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and national governments have a key role to play 
in helping to achieve progress towards development goals, but it is increasingly suggested 
that business activities may also be of critical importance (Pachauri, 2004). This is, perhaps, 
particularly so as globalisation has seen the power, influence and prominence of business 
corporations rise to new heights (Jamali, 2010). Moreover, within developing countries it 
may be the case that the incumbent government are failing to achieve such development 
goals.  
 
The contribution of business to help achieve development goals can take many forms. First, 
businesses that operate in developing countries can provide employment to the local 
population. Second, these same businesses could provide tax revenues for the governments of 
developing countries. Third, these businesses could provide opportunities to others through 
their supply chain needs. Fourth, the products, such as energy, and services, perhaps 
financial, of these businesses may be available to the developing country’s population. In 
these ways, as well as others, the core activities of business can help to raise and distribute 
income that may help to address the development goals of a country. In addition, businesses 
may also contribute to development goals through their CSR programmes. Such programmes 
can directly target, for example health or educational, issues that may not be core to their own 
business, but are nevertheless perceived to be critical aspects of development. 
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Multinational corporations can approach their CSR activities differently. One question relates 
to the extent that there should be a centralised global strategy or a more decentralised local 
approach. It is suggested that the more centralised CSR programmes would tend to focus on 
‘universal standards’ (Jamali, 2010), whereas a more localised approach may be more 
sensitive to specific issues within local communities. The danger of a global CSR strategy is 
that it potentially fails to appropriately target the substantive development issues and needs 
within a specific community. Adapting CSR initiatives to the specific community within 
which the operations occur would increase their legitimacy within the developing nation or 
region.  
 
The business case for exploitation 
 
Whilst business could potentially contribute to development, there is a counter argument that 
the globalisation of business, whereby goods, capital and people can relatively easily cross 
national boundaries can have negative consequences. Low income levels and the desire for 
development can lead to the temptation to exploit the resources and opportunities available 
within these economies. These resources can be human in that a number of these countries 
have large populations living in poverty. Similarly natural resources, such as minerals, oil, 
gas, and forests, are available in a number of these economies. Alongside this availability of 
resources it is also the case that the legal and regulatory regimes within emerging and less 
developed economies are often weaker and less strictly enforced than those in more advanced 
economies. The weak enforcement of regulation and legislation and ‘rampant corruption’ 
within these countries leaves the potential for corporations to voluntarily self-regulate and, as 
Hilson (2012) concludes “in many developing countries, however, the drive to legislate and 
enforce regulations is missing” (p.136). Furthermore, globally there are gaps in legislation 
and regulation, which provide multinational corporations with opportunities to choose to 
locate in countries with relatively weak legislation and regulations, ‘a phenomenon recently 
referred to as “regulatory arbitrage (Jenkins, 2005)” (Jamali, 2010, p.183). This combination 
of low income, available resources and weak legal infrastructure make these economies 
vulnerable and exploitable in a way that would not be possible in more advanced economies.  
 
For some with financial power the resources available in emerging and less developed 
economies must appear extremely attractive. Often developing countries lack the money, 
knowledge and skills to ‘exploit’ their natural resources (Sikka, 2011). Global financial 
institutions and multinational corporations can provide the necessary finance, knowledge and 
skills, but at what cost? The power relations between financial ‘investors’ and the 
governments and citizens of emerging and less developed economies would seem 
problematic. In order to attract much needed foreign investment the governments of 
developing countries may need to provide concessions or assurances concerning future 
legislation and regulation. For example (Sikka, 2011) writes about the stabilization clauses 
included in agreements relating to the “Chad-Cameroon oil and pipeline project”. In general, 
such stabilisation clauses restrict the government of the associated developing country to 
legislate, regulate and tax on social and environmental issues.  
 
Even once an investment is received there is a danger that it can be taken away. Financial 
capital is easily transferred and as such can choose to favour any one of a number of 
emerging and less developed economies. Systemically, fierce competition amongst emerging 
and less developed economies for foreign direct investment (FDI) leaves a developing 
nation’s labour force in a weak and vulnerable position. Ukpere and Slabbert (2009, p.37) 
find that “the logics of current globalisation seem to have exacerbated the problem of global 
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unemployment, the corollary of which is endemic inequality and poverty.” They argue that 
corporate migration, outsourcing and downsizing help, at least in part, to explain ‘growing 
unemployment and underemployment’. Further, such un/underemployment exacerbates 
levels of income and wealth inequality with the poor becoming ever more impoverished. 
Such inequality and poverty is most keenly felt in developing nations and this has many 
societal and environmental consequences within these vulnerable societies and communities. 
Ukpere and Slabbert (2007) clearly state that higher level of poverty is not natural, but rather 
result from “the selfish capitalist institutions created by man” (p.5). Even where income and 
wealth is created within a developing nation its benefit is often the reserve of the elite and 
very little benefit trickles down to those in poverty (Ukpere & Slabbert, 2009). 
 
We see, therefore, that in developing countries labour wages cannot be raised in order to 
increase the standard of living if this results in divestment. The threat of divestment is a real 
and frightening prospect for many vulnerable communities. Of relevance here is the debate as 
to the ethics of ‘sweatshop labour’. Sweatshops are identified as requiring their employees to 
work for long hours in extremely poor and often dangerous conditions for very low pay. To 
many such conditions are abhorrent, but it is increasingly argued that such work “represents 
the best option available for desperately poor workers to improve their lives and the lives of 
their family” (Powell & Zwolinski, 2012, p.449). If the alternative is unemployment, which is 
worse still, then it is ‘rational’ to choose the lesser of two evils, irrespective of whether the 
conditions are inhumane and precarious (Prieto-Carrón, Lund-Thomson, Chan, Muro, & 
Bhushan, 2006). Powell and Zwolinski (2012) also argue that laws or regulations to improve 
pay and/or conditions will result in higher production costs, which in turn will “unemploy at 
least some marginal workers and close some marginal firms” (p. 457). If such laws or 
regulations were unilaterally imposed in a single developing country then the loss of 
employment in that country could well be greater than just the marginal workers as the 
employers could chose to relocate to other jurisdictions that do not have such regulations or 
legislation and so are cheaper.  
 
Moreover, Islam and McPhail (2011, p.792) argue that “developing nations become 
structurally dependent on the business of large multinational corporations, a scenario which 
often results in a preoccupation with trying to keep foreign multinationals happy with cheap 
labour.” An individual developing country that legislated or regulated labour practices would 
place itself at a comparative disadvantage and so international organisations, such as the ILO, 
may perceive a need to ‘protect’ these “weak economic participants in states with weak 
regulatory and enforcement environments (Muchlinski, 2003)” (Islam & McPhail, 2011, 
p.793). Powell and Zwolinski (2012) would argue, however, that such international action 
would still lead to higher costs that would lead to the unemployment of some where the 
increased marginal labour cost exceeds the marginal benefit. Thus Powell and Zwolinski 
(2012) contend that in terms of economic reasoning sweatshop labour is preferable to the 
alternative. They then acknowledge that some doubt its ‘moral defensibility’ on the grounds 
of coercion or exploitation. They argue that sweatshop labour is not coerced, as there is a 
choice however limited. Further, they question whether the relationship is exploitative given 
that both the business and the employee benefit and as it is unclear whether the “distribution 
of burdens and benefits between sweatshop workers and MNEs is unfair” (emphasis in 
original, p. 466). We accept that it may well be difficult to credibly establish unfairness, but 
this potential for exploitation is an instance where the need for appropriate transparency and 
accountability mechanisms becomes more important.  
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Thus far we have noted the vulnerability of the labour force, but we also noted that many 
emerging and less developed countries contain other valuable natural resources. Such 
resources may be assumed to be a blessing, but in contrast has often been labelled a ‘curse’ 
(Sarr & Wick, 2010). Intuitively, an abundance of resources, which have a value within the 
global economy, should enable growth and development. Historically, many of the most 
advanced countries in the world today appeared to benefit in this way. More recently, 
however, less developed countries that have such resources do not appear to have developed 
in the same way (Di John, 2011) and there is empirical evidence to suggest that resource-rich 
developing countries have lower per capita income (Auty, 2007), “lower growth rates, lower 
levels of human development, and more inequality and poverty (Bulte, Damania, & Deacon, 
2005; Gylfason, 2001; Sachs & Warner, 1995) ” (Kolstad, Wiig, & Williams, 2009, p.954). 
Pegg (2010) highlights “five different dimensions” of the resource curse literature and these 
can be summarised as: 
 
1. A lack of investment in education; 
2. A greater likelihood of civil war; 
3. Reduces the competitiveness of these industries. This leads to an increased reliance 
upon the markets for the natural resources, which are inherently risky and volatile 
(Pegg, 2010). The Nigerian disease - a proclivity towards undemocratic governance; 
4. An increase in levels of corruption; and 
5. A weaker economic growth due to the ‘Dutch disease’, whereby agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors suffer as labour and capital are reallocated to the natural 
resource industry. 
 
Williams (2011) categorises the explanations of the resource curse into relating either to the 
‘Dutch disease’ or the ‘Nigerian disease’. As noted above the Dutch disease sees capital and 
labour being moved away from the manufacturing and agriculture sectors, which increases 
costs and reduces the competitiveness of these industries. This leads to an increased reliance 
upon the markets for the natural resources, which are inherently risky and volatile (Pegg, 
2010). The Nigerian disease,, according to Williams (2011), relates the resource curse to a 
failure by the country’s government to make effective use of the revenues that flow from the 
natural resources. Within these explanations corruption, weak institutions and rent-seeking 
activities are prominent.  
 
Democratic and institutional reforms have been called for to help alleviate these problems. As 
such it is argued that good institutions and good governance can result in resources producing 
‘good outcomes’ rather than being a curse (Stevens & Dietsche, 2008). Strong institutions 
and good governance can provide a balance against the possibility of the benefits of the 
resources being used for personal and political advantage by those in power. They continue 
that more inclusive and democratic institutions that “raise the relative voice and influence of 
those not being included in decisions on how resource revenues are spent” (Kolstad & Wiig, 
2009b, p.5322) are needed. Unfortunately, there is evidence to suggest that natural resources 
are negatively correlated with voice and accountability (Alexeev & Conrad, 2011). 
 
Improved transparency and accountability may help to address these problems and in 
particular (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a) question whether transparency could help reduce 
corruption, which is a key aspect of the resource curse. Transparency can make visible costs 
and make detection of corruption more likely (Williams, 2011), although it is not considered 
sufficient by itself (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009a). In effect the work reviewed here has focused 
upon governmental transparency and accountability, but this relates to transactions with 
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corporations and therefore we would argue that corporate transparency and accountability is 
also relevant and potentially a powerful mechanism through which civil society can monitor 
the benefits (or not) of natural resources. Corporate accountability for their actions with 
regard to the terms of the contracts agreed and payments made will provide civil society with 
powerful information. 
 
The need for accountability and transparency 
 
Carroll’s (1991) CSR pyramid suggests that the first responsibility of business is economic 
and this is then followed by legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities respectively. 
Visser (2008) contends, however, that in practice there is a different ranking of 
responsibilities in developing countries. Whilst he suggests that economic responsibilities, 
such as providing investment, employment and tax revenues, are still primary it is the 
philanthropic responsibilities for social and community projects that appears to be secondary. 
The higher emphasis upon philanthropy in developing countries, he argues, is the result of 
strong philanthropic traditions, an increasing acceptance of a reliance on aid, and the nature 
of educational, health and social issues that are present in developing countries. Legal 
responsibilities appear third and are therefore argued to be relatively less important in 
developing countries due to the limited resources to develop, administer and enforce the 
appropriate legal infrastructure. Ethical responsibilities appear last and Visser (2008) argues 
that this is evidenced by the continuing high levels of corruption that remains in many 
developing countries. Whilst in practice ethical responsibilities are given a low priority in 
developing countries, Visser (2008) contends that they should be afforded the highest 
priority. He argues that it is through more ethical and transparent practices that business can 
contribute to development goals and we suggest that this is particularly important given the 
vulnerability of these populations. If ethical responsibility is paramount, then legal limitations 
can be overcome (Jamali & Mirshak, 2006). 
 
Similarly, Sud and VanSandt (2012) argue that if current inequality is to be replaced by 
distributive justice, then the prevailing free markets need to be replaced with ethical, or ‘fair’, 
markets. Such ‘fair’ markets, they argue, require ‘countervailing forces with roughly equal 
power’ (p. 135) such that the decisions making process is less unequal. The unfairness 
endemic within the current free market, at least in part, stems from information asymmetry. 
They highlight the potential role that transparency could play in attempts to create fairer 
markets. They suggest that the judiciary and media have important roles to play, but the need 
for information is essential to any such changes. This again points us toward the particular 
need for reporting and disclosure within developing nations. Powerful corporations are a key 
part of these markets and so the need for them to be transparent and accountable is 
fundamentally important to fairer markets and steps towards greater distributive justice. 
 
Utting (2007) suggests that the most vulnerable communities, those at risk from poverty and 
who lack resilience, are not only deprived of income, food, health (etc.), but also have 
restricted voice and influence within their local and also global communities. Utting proposes 
that accountability is one mechanism by which inequality and corporate power can be 
counterbalanced. He identifies the lack of involvement of stakeholders within developing 
countries as a serious flaw in current business practice. He concludes that the issues of 
empowerment and redistribution of income to the weakest, most impoverished citizens from 
developing nations is currently absent from the corporate agenda. Newell and Frynas (2007) 
also recognise the important role that accountability mechanisms can play in addressing 
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issues of development and poverty particularly through initiatives that enable groups 
representing those in poverty to hold corporations and investors to account. 
On the same theme, Jenkins (2005) suggests that in order for business to really help tackle 
poverty and inequality there would need to be a conscious strategy in place to discriminate in 
favour of those in poverty. In particular, Jenkins suggests that prices of goods and 
employment opportunities would need to deliberately favour those in poverty. Further, most 
multinational corporations currently chose to invest in the capital cities of developing nations, 
but this ‘excludes’ those living in poverty in rural areas. Those living in poverty in remote 
areas are rarely considered to be stakeholders of the multinational corporations and so are 
excluded from the direct benefits of business activity. There is inequality both within 
developing nations and between them. Kolk and Van Tulder (2006) suggest that most 
investment is targeted towards a small number of industries within a small number of 
developing countries.  
 
Given the apparent vulnerability and exploitability it is even more important that, in these 
economies, organisations act responsibly and ethically. It is in this light that the social and 
environmental accounting and reporting of organisations operating within these economies 
should be considered. Time and again we find that accountability and transparency are 
recommended in order to provide a countervailing check against the possibility of 
exploitation and for sustainable development particularly in emerging and less developed 
economies. It is in this context that we next introduce the contributions made by the papers in 
this special issue. 
 
 
3. The papers in this special issue and their contributions 
 
Having articulated the notions of vulnerability and exploitability above, we now apply them 
to discuss the five papers included in this special issue and identify their contributions to the 
social and environmental accounting and accountability literature. A summary of the papers 
is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2:  Summary of the papers in this special issue 
 
Authors Research 
Objective 
Theory Method, Data 
and Country 
focus 
Key findings and conclusions Main Contributions 
Soobaroyen 
and Ntim 
(2013) 
To examine the 
corporate 
disclosure 
behaviour of 75 
South African 
listed 
corporations 
with regards to 
HIV/AIDS 
Organisational 
legitimacy, 
symbolic and 
substantive 
management 
Content analysis 
 
South Africa 
A combination of substantive and 
symbolic disclosures is used to 
reflect changing stakeholder 
salience, societal attitudes and the 
corporation’s current ‘state’ of 
legitimacy. 
Provides an interpretive framework 
which combines Suchman’s (1995) 
mode of organisational legitimacy and 
Ashforth and Gibbs’ (1990) concepts of 
symbolic and substantive management to 
investigate how and why public 
corporations rely on symbolic and 
substantive social disclosures. 
Buccina, 
Chene, and 
Gramlich 
(2013) 
 
 
To examine 
Chevron’s 
disclosure 
strategy for 
potential 
liabilities 
Legitimacy 
theory, 
stakeholder 
theory 
Case Study 
Ecuador 
Chevron’s intense focus on 
shareholders’ financial concerns 
sustained its legitimacy in the U.S. 
even under intense activist, media, 
and political pressure.  
Demonstrates that strategic management 
of powerful stakeholders allows an 
organization to maintain legitimacy even 
under heightened pressure and potential 
economic loss. 
Hassan and 
Reza 
(2013) 
 
 
 
To explain 
changes in 
carbon dioxide 
emissions and 
related 
disclosures 
Environmental 
performance 
and disclosure  
Regression 
analysis 
Nigeria 
Gas prices and participation in the 
Kyoto Protocol are not strong 
enough to result in net decreases in 
carbon dioxide emissions over the 
period studied. Changes in emission 
levels affects amount of disclosure. 
Demonstrates a novel approach to 
systematically examining determinants 
of one type of environmental 
performance and associated disclosures 
at the nation level of analysis.  
Beddewela 
and Herzig 
(2013) 
To examine the 
pressures, 
barriers and 
enablers which 
Institutional 
Dualism – 
internal v. 
external 
Interviews with 
MNC subsidiary 
managers in Sri 
Lanka 
MNC subsidiaries are concerned 
about gaining ‘internal legitimacy’ 
and that this acts as a barrier against 
the publishing of separate social 
Highlights the CSR reporting behaviour 
of MNC subsidiaries in the Sri Lankan 
context with the use of Institutional 
Dualism. 
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subsidiaries of 
multinational 
companies 
encounter when 
engaging in 
corporate social 
reporting within 
a developing 
country context. 
legitimacy reports in Sri Lanka. In their pursuit 
of internal legitimacy via compliance 
with the reporting requirements of 
the head office needs and priorities 
of the local vulnerable stakeholders 
were compromised. 
Momin 
(2013) 
To explore the 
perceptions of 
NGOs on social 
and 
environmental 
disclosures in 
Bangladesh. 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Semi-structured 
interviews with 
selected social 
and 
environmental 
NGOs in 
Bangladesh 
NGO executives are sceptical of 
current CSR reporting practice. To 
them, current CSR reporting is ad 
hoc and no more than a public 
relations exercise, lacking credibility. 
Most importantly, owing to structural 
constraints NGO executives assign 
lesser significance to CSR reporting 
than to direct corporate involvement 
in social development. 
Provides a non-managerial stakeholder 
voice in social and environmental 
accounting literature. 
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Soobaroyen and Ntim (2013), the first paper in this special issue, undertakes a critical 
scrutiny of HIV (Human Immunodeficiency Virus)/AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency 
Syndrome) disclosure behaviour within the corporate annual and sustainability reports of the 
South African companies against the benchmark of GRI Guidelines. Based on a rigorous 
analysis of 525 annual reports and 62 stand-alone sustainability reports for the period 2003-
2009 the authors conclude that South African companies used a combination of substantive 
and symbolic disclosure strategies to be in alignment with the changing status of corporate 
legitimacy and societal attitudes towards the vulnerable issue of HIV/AIDS. 
 
The paper illuminates South Africa’s vulnerability to the disease of HIV/AIDS and the 
corporate sector’s reactions towards it. Although South Africa is considered to be one of the 
Top 50 wealthiest countries of the world in terms of life expectancy it features in the worst 30 
(Aliber, Kirsten, Maharajh, Nhlapo-Hlope, & Nkoane, 2006). The vulnerability of South 
Africa is exemplified by a population of 5.7 million affected by HIV which represents 12% of 
the total population mostly within the working age group. Soobaroyen and Ntim (2013) notes 
that vulnerability towards HIV/AIDS could be attributed to the exploitation of poor black 
employees which is evidenced by ‘a long history of inequalities and poor labour practices 
during the apartheid era, notably in the mining industry (Dickinson, 2004; Fig, 2005)’. They 
show that HIV/AIDS prevalence tripled in 2000 from a 7.6% in 1994. By this time it assumed 
a full blown epidemic level.  
 
Given the enormous impact on the working age population this health crisis was not only 
devastating for the affected families and their dependents it also badly affected corporate 
sector which needs to rely on a reliable supply of working force. The impact on the business 
was felt in form of declining productivity and the increased costs of supporting the affected 
employees. In the wake of initial lethargic response from the South African government to 
face this challenge of health crisis corporate response was typified by denial, discrimination 
against the affected workers and unwillingness to respond. In the initial years corporate 
response was limited to blaming the government for lack of initiatives while ignoring their 
own complicity in it. However, there were some changes in the corporate attitude during the 
period 2003-2007 when government finally stood up to the challenge before the crisis went 
out of hands. The changes in government responses came in the form of stricter employment 
laws, strong nationwide awareness campaign and a strategic plan to tackle the crisis. 
Soobaroyen and Ntim (2013) contend that the changes in corporate attitude could also have 
been created by the danger of attracting bad press and criticism from civil society for lack of 
corporate initiatives in this regard. They question to what extent those changes were 
accompanied by substantive changes in the corporate behaviour via transparent disclosure on 
HIV/AIDS. So important was this issue that in 2003 in an unprecedented move Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) came up with an exclusive guideline on HIV/AIDS. The GRI 
guidelines was specifically tested in the South African context and informed by the local 
stakeholders. In spite of much discussion while Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) declined 
to include it as part of its listing requirements King II Report on Corporate Government 
recommended its voluntary adoption in South Africa. 
 
The analysis by Soobaroyen and Ntim (2013) shows that South African companies’ 
compliance can be described as piecemeal, incomplete and lacking comparability and 
transparency. While there was some evidence of substantive response in the disclosure 
behaviour they were far from satisfactory and appear to be motivated by ‘specific 
legitimating agenda’ rather than driven by a desire to discharge accountability to the relevant 
stakeholders such as employees, government and the society in general. The paper’s main 
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contribution lies in the development of an interpretive framework based on the dynamics of 
organisational legitimacy model of Suchman (1995) and the symbolic and substantive 
management model of Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) and its empirical illustration via HIV/AIDS 
reporting in South Africa.  
 
Given the vulnerability and exploitability of HIV/AIDS in South Africa much more 
substantive initiatives were expected from the South African companies. Instead the paper 
reveals an ad hoc approach as evidenced by incomplete disclosures resulting in lack of 
transparency and accountability in them. It only shows that although complete and 
transparent disclosures on HIV/AIDS in South Africa had the potential to expose the 
vulnerabilities and exploitabilities involved in this regard such potential of social and 
environmental accounting is unlikely to be achieved by global voluntary initiatives alone. 
This finding has implications for policy makers and regulators.  
 
The second paper by Buccina, Chene and Gramlich (2013) is a case study that provides an in-
depth examination of Texaco Corporation’s and later Chevron Corporation’s potential legal 
obligations resulting from 30 years of oil drilling and extraction activities in Ecuador.  This 
study reveals through its analysis, an example of how a parent company, headquartered in the 
United States, managed its obligations in less developed countries with little concern for local 
stakeholders (Belal & Owen, 2007). The authors present relevant background information on 
the case to illustrate the amount of political, mass media, and shareholder activist attention 
that was given to the oil corporation’s actions in Ecuador. This background information 
reveals how a global oil company can defend its business case for the exploitation of natural 
resources of a less developed country. The pressure reported is contrasted with the 
corporation’s overriding concern with protecting its primary shareholders. Buccina et al. 
(2013) apply the accounting standards that were in place during this time to the facts they 
determine to be applicable to Texaco’s and Chevron’s assessment of this potential liability in 
Ecuador. The authors conclude that Chevron was late in disclosing this potential liability 
based on their analysis of the facts and applicable standards. The paper then focuses on the 
rationales Texaco and Chevron used to justify omitting financial statement disclosure of the 
potential liability to be owed in Ecuador even though accounting standard requirements for 
disclosure were met. In the paper, Buccina et al. (2013) examine Chevron’s arguments that 
because they were operating in a highly uncertain legal environment, courts lacked 
jurisdiction, and/or relevant statute of limitations had run out, no proper, quantified disclosure 
was required. The authors then show how Chevron’s first financial statement disclosure of 
this potential liability was provided by the corporation in 2009. Through the use of legitimacy 
theory, the paper chronicles how significant legitimacy threatening events took place in 2008 
and early 2009 that may account for Chevron management’s decision to change its 
disclosure. Overall, the case shows how, in the case of Chevron in Ecuador, a large global oil 
corporation manages its legitimacy and disclosure decisions when dealing with serious 
questions concerning its handling of environmental activities in a less developed country.   
 
The third paper in this issue, Hassan and Reza (2013), uses a quantitative modelling approach 
to empirically investigate the determinants of changes in the annual amount of carbon dioxide 
emissions in Nigeria that result from gas flaring.  The authors study the period from 1965 to 
2009. In addition, the authors develop and test an empirical model to examine the relationship 
between changes in emission levels and the extent of related carbon dioxide emission 
disclosures provided by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). This study 
contributes significantly to the diversity of research approaches used in the studies published 
in this special issue and demonstrates how the analysis of a specific type of pollution 
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production (carbon emissions from gas flaring) can be used to help learn about specific 
pollution disclosures (reporting of carbon emissions).  The authors tackle an important 
greenhouse gas emission issue because Nigerian gas flaring is the highest contributor to total 
greenhouse gas emissions in Africa (Hassan and Reza, 2013). This problem, which the 
Nigerian government has made attempts to curtail since 1969, has been on-going.  The paper 
details many of the efforts made by governmental and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) to dissuade gas flaring through regulation or incentives. They discuss the severity of 
the emission problem and the severity of its consequential effects to air quality, vegetation, 
and crop quality.  Each of these problems represent the types of social and environmental 
risks that local populations in less developed countries often face when the exploitation of 
their natural resources are privileged over the local environment. Unfortunately, oil company 
disclosures regarding this issue are not common. As Hassan and Reza (2013) point out, the 
“usual norm is to register the joint venture company as a private limited company, not 
mandated by law to make public disclosures except to its owners.” Although the authors were 
able to track evidence of soft disclosures on gas flaring in Nigeria to the global reports of 
Shell, Chevron, and ExxonMobil for some years, the disclosures were erratic and vague. 
They were able to gather disclosure information from the NNPC and used this data in their 
disclosure tests. Their results show a continuing weak utilization of other methods of disposal 
of associated natural gas, thus concluding that gas flaring remains a significant producer of 
greenhouse gases in Nigeria. Hassan and Reza (2013) conclude that oil and gas companies 
involved in these production activities “do not have much concern for the negative 
environmental impact” of gas flaring. The authors also conclude that the level of gas flaring 
related disclosure is most likely guided by “bureaucratic rules inherent within the structure of 
government-controlled corporations or agencies in Nigeria.” Thus, environmental 
performance does not appear to be related to disclosure in this setting.           
 
The fourth paper by Beddewela and Herzig (2013) examines the corporate social disclosure 
strategies by the Sri Lankan subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs). While we 
know the activities of these MNCs in developed countries we know very little about their 
activities in emerging and less developed countries (Islam & Deegan, 2010; Newson & 
Deegan, 2002). Social and environmental impact of MNC operations in less developed 
countries is of particular concern to the policy makers and regulators given the vulnerabilities 
and exploitabilities of these weaker states and powerlessness of the local stakeholders. As we 
argued in section two social and environmental accounting and accountability has the 
potential to make those impacts visible and thereby hold those MNCs to account. Beddewela 
and Herzig (2013) provides interesting insights in this regard.   
 
Based on a series of interviews with the managers of MNC subsidiaries in Sri Lanka 
Beddewela and Herzig (2013) show that MNC subsidiaries in less developed countries face 
the challenge of institutional duality. On the one hand they seek internal legitimacy by 
conforming to the regulations and policies of MNC head office based in Western developed 
countries. On the other hand, in their endeavour to obtain ‘licence to operate’ they seek 
external legitimacy from local stakeholders of less developed countries. The results of the 
study reveal a tension between these two types of legitimacy seeking activities. More 
specifically, the authors conclude that the subsidiaries were more preoccupied with seeking 
internal legitimacy to be in line with head office requirements and control. In that process the 
concerns of the local stakeholders were ignored as evidenced by the lack of comprehensive 
and transparent social reporting reflecting those concerns. In order to remedy the situation 
they argue for substantive regulatory and policy changes requiring MNCs to take more 
responsibility for their operations in less developed countries. However, given the state of 
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corruption and governance in the government apparatus in those countries whether they are 
powerful enough to enforce desired changes remains a moot question. Under these 
circumstances the role of civil society and NGOs operating in less developed countries in 
promoting social and environmental accountability in organisations may be a potential 
avenue worth exploring. The final paper of this special issue examines the perceptions of 
CSR reporting by a group of social and environmental NGOs in Bangladesh.   
 
While most of the previous social and environmental accounting studies examined CSR 
reporting from the corporate perspective a literature is emerging which examines it from the 
stakeholder perspective (Belal & Roberts, 2010; O'Dwyer, Unerman, & Bradley, 2005; 
O'Dwyer, Unerman, & Hession, 2005; Tilt, 1994). The paper by Momin (2013) extends this 
underdeveloped literature which brings a stakeholder voice, in this case mainly the voice of 
Southern NGOs on the emerging phenomenon of CSR reporting in Bangladesh. Given the 
vulnerability of the emerging and less developed countries it is important to capture concerns 
of the less developed countries’ stakeholders for the reasons noted in section two of this 
paper. Otherwise there is a danger that dominant corporate discourses will continue to ignore 
and marginalise them, as Beddewela and Herzig (2013) highlights, and those voices may 
never be heard. We emphasise the significance of bringing those voices in the public domain.  
 
Using a stakeholder perspective Momin (2013) utilises data gathered from a series of 
interviews with NGOs operating in Bangladesh to explore how they perceive the CSR 
reporting activities of the Bangladeshi companies. In line with Belal and Roberts (2010) he 
concludes that NGOs view the rise of CSR reporting in Bangladesh with scepticism as they 
lack completeness and gloss over crucial issues like labour conditions and environmental 
pollution. They note that NGOs work with the local media in order to expose corporate 
complicity in various social and environmental irresponsibilities. Momin attributes such lack 
of social and environmental accountability to a number of vulnerability issues such as high 
levels of poverty, lack of governance, dependence on foreign aid and investments and a nexus 
of political and business elites deeply complicit in corruptions. Such an environment creates 
even further opportunities for corporate exploitation of the vulnerable stakeholders such as 
women workers of export oriented garments factories. As we argued in section two this 
context further strengthens the case for social and environmental accountability in less 
developed countries to expose those vulnerabilities and exploitations.  
     
 
4. Conclusions and future directions for research 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the papers included in this special issue 
and thereby to frame a research agenda for the future. For this purpose we have used an 
analytical framework involving the notions of vulnerability and exploitability to make sense 
and to inform discussion of the findings and contributions of these papers. We believe it 
helped us to bring to the fore some of the unfairness and injustices involved in corporate 
activities in the emerging and less developed countries.  
 
We argue that structural dependencies (Islam & McPhail, 2011) of the less developed 
countries on foreign aid and foreign direct investments (often via MNCs and joint ventures) 
coupled with cheap labour, large markets (as evidenced by large populations) and rich natural 
resources make them susceptible to exploitation. Such vulnerabilities often leave weaker 
developing country stakeholders in precarious positions often unable to seek redress when 
their needs and concerns are ignored. This situation has not been helped by the corruption 
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permeated by the nexus of political and business elites in some of these countries. This is 
revealed by a number of papers in this special issue. 
 
The findings of Beddewela and Herzig (2013) show that Sri Lankan MNC subsidiaries are 
preoccupied with appeasing their Head Offices in developed countries often at the cost of 
ignoring the pressing concerns of the local stakeholders. A similar behaviour is also observed 
in the corporate activities of Texaco and Chevron in the process of exploiting the natural 
resources in Ecuador (Buccina et al., 2013). Buccina et al (2013) show how these US oil and 
gas giants were compelled to disclose its environmental liabilities in Ecuador which they 
initially declined to disclose. 
 
In the context of Nigerian oil and gas sector Hassan and Reza (2013) highlight the severity of 
the emissions arising from gas flaring and the resultant effects on the local flora and fauna. 
Environmental disclosures made by the oil and gas companies often do not capture these 
local social and environmental impacts unless they are exposed. This is evidenced by the 
disclosure behaviour of Texaco and Chevron with regard to environmental liabilities of their 
operations in Ecuador. Similar behaviour was also displayed by the South African companies 
with regard to their responses to the HIV/AIDs epidemic. Soobaroyen and Ntim’s (2013) 
painstaking analysis of corporate disclosures on HIV/AIDs by the South African companies 
reveals that a corporate legitimisation agenda was pursued mainly via symbolic disclosures 
with some limited substantive disclosures. 
 
The above discussion makes it clear that, although social and environmental accounting has 
the potential to make organisations accountable for their dealings with vulnerable and 
exploitable communities within emerging and less developed countries, voluntary corporate 
disclosure is unlikely to capture it given their alleged role in the permeation of such 
conditions. The limits of voluntary disclosures mean regulatory and policy reforms are 
necessary to bring about substantive change. The fragile legal and governance structures 
within these countries, however, mean that the recommending such reforms cannot be made 
without reservations. We remain concerned that there are systemic barriers to such reforms as 
companies make use of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ (Jamali, 2010; Jenkins, 2005) to locate in 
countries with relatively weak legislation and regulations.   
 
Given our reservations concerning voluntary corporate disclosures and policy reforms, it is 
important for academic research to provide more empirical evidence and expose the lack of 
transparency and incompleteness in such discourses. At the same time we should endeavour 
to provide empirical evidence to show alternative accounts of social and environmental 
impacts arising from corporate activities and thus make vulnerability and exploitation visible. 
In addition, research could bring in the marginalised voices of local stakeholders located 
within the emerging and less developed countries which otherwise might not be heard at all 
(Kolstad & Wiig, 2009b). The paper by Momin (2013), in this special issue, does exactly this. 
His findings illuminate some of the concerns and expectations of Southern NGOs regarding 
the development of CSR reporting in Bangladesh. We encourage this stream of research 
which can provide counter perspectives to the extant dominant corporate discourse. These 
perspectives from local stakeholders such as local communities, state agencies, civil society, 
employees and media are even more important in the context of emerging and less developed 
economies. 
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We believe that through this special issue we have developed a strong research agenda for 
social and environmental accountability in emerging and less developed economies. We 
invoke the notions of vulnerability and exploitability to frame this research agenda. We hope 
that future researchers will take up some of the research directions outlined above. 
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